EUD Security Guidance: OS X 10.11

This guidance is applicable to all Apple devices running OS X 10.11. This guidance was developed following testing performed on MacBook Pro and MacBook Air devices running OS X 10.11.0.

It is important to remember that any guidance points given here are just recommendations. None of the suggestions should be seen as being mandatory. They have been suggested as a way of satisfying the 12 security recommendations.

Risk owners and administrators should agree a configuration which balances the business requirements, usability and security of the platform. This guidance can be consulted for advice where needed.

Risk owners’ summary

To minimise risk when using OS X 10.11 as part of a remote working scenario, you should adopt the following architectural choices:

All data should be routed over a secure VPN to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the traffic, and to benefit from your organisation’s protective monitoring solutions.
User accounts should be created locally on the OS X devices and managed remotely using Mobile Device Management (MDM).
Users should not be permitted to install arbitrary third-party applications on the device. Applications which users require should be pre-installed before users are assigned devices, be provisioned as part of the device image, or installed using MDM.
When configured in this way, risk owners should be aware of the following technical risks associated with this platform:

Associated security principle

Explanation of risks

Assured data-in-transit protection

While the native VPN has no formal assurance in the UK, third-party VPNs are available which have. Assured products should be used in preference to unassured products.

Assured data-at-rest protection

The FileVault 2 full-volume encryption product has no formal assurance in the UK, and does not support some of the mandatory requirements expected from assured full-disk encryption products. Without assurance in FileVault 2 there is a risk that data stored on the device could be compromised.

FileVault 2 does not use any dedicated hardware to protect its keys. If an attacker can get physical access to the device, they can extract password hashes and perform an offline brute-force attack to recover the encryption password.

Secure boot

Secure boot is not supported on this platform.

External interface protection

Most OS X devices have external interfaces which permit Direct Memory Access (DMA) from connected peripherals. Whilst the configuration in this section limits DMA to times when the user is logged in and the screen is unlocked, this still presents an opportunity for a local attacker to extract keys and data.

Device update policy

You cannot force the user to update their device or software remotely. However, it is possible to turn on automatic updates locally. Third-party utilities may mitigate this issue.

Administrators’ deployment guide


To meet the principles outlined in the End User Devices Security Framework, several recommendations are given in the table below.

Security Principle

Recommendation and Explanation

Assured data-in-transit protection

Use a Foundation Grade IPsec VPN client configured as per that product’s security procedures to provide data-in-transit protection.

Assured data-at-rest protection

Use FileVault 2 to provide full-volume encryption. As the users’ password is not tied to hardware, it should be strong enough to resist an offline brute-force attack. The required strength should be determined by your organisation’s authentication policy.



Users have two passwords – one for FileVault 2, and one to login and unlock their device (see Provisioning Steps for how to achieve this)
Or users have one password which fulfils both requirements.
The user should be required to authenticate to the device in line with your organisation’s authentication policy (see Authentication Policy).

This user’s login password derives a key which encrypts certificates and other credentials, giving access to organisation’s services.

Secure boot

Set an EFI (firmware) password to make it more difficult for an attacker to modify the boot process. However, with physical access, the boot process can still be compromised.

Platform integrity and application sandboxing

OS X 10.11 introduces a new security policy which extends protection to critical system components, both on disk and at run time. The new policy prevents users and applications from modifying files in several high-level directories. This feature is enabled by default in the OS and no user configuration is required.

Application Whitelisting

Use the MDM to whitelist default OS X applications. Use the GateKeeper to prevent the installation and running of unsigned applications. An organisation application catalogue can also be used which should only contain enterprise-approved or in-house applications.

Malicious code detection and prevention

XProtect is built into OS X. It has a limited signature set which is maintained by Apple to detect widespread malware. XProtect will also restrict vulnerable plugin versions (such as Java) to limit exposure. Several third-party anti-malware products also exist which attempt to detect malicious code for this platform. Content-based attacks can be filtered by scanning capabilities in the organisation.

Security policy enforcement

Mark MDM profiles as non-removable so the user cannot remove them and alter their configuration.

External interface protection

USB removable media can be blocked through MDM if required. If an EFI password is set, DMA is only possible when the device is booted and unlocked.

Device Update Policy

MDM can be used to audit which App Store software and OS versions are installed on a device. The attached script will turn on automatic updates, but this cannot be achieved remotely with MDM.

Event collection for enterprise analysis

OS X logs can be viewed by a local administrator on device, or from a distance using remote administration tools. Third-party software can also be used to automate log collection.

Incident Response

OS X devices can be locked, wiped, and configured remotely by their MDM.

Recommended network architecture

All remote or mobile working scenarios should use a typical remote access architecture with a VPN terminating into a DMZ. The following network diagram describes the recommended architecture for this platform.

A Mobile Device Management server is required. Apple’s OS X Server Profile Manager is sufficient for this purpose. Alternatively, third-party products exist which may offer additional functionality over and above Profile Manager.

Preparation for deployment

The steps below should be followed to prepare your organisation’s infrastructure for hosting a deployment of these devices:

Set up an MDM server (eg Profile Manager on OS X Server). This may require setting up the Open Directory component of an OS X Server.
Ensure all Configuration Profiles are signed to prevent modification in transit, or post install
Create policies on Profile Manager for:
Exchange/Mail/Calendar Settings.
Ensure ‘Use SSL’ is selected for all server settings

Disabling access to the Preference Panes in Restrictions (OS X) for iCloud and Network as access to these could be used to disable the VPN.

See the Recommended policies and settings section for more detail on the above.

You can also consider creating policies in other sections of Profile Manager. In particular, we recommend that administrators:

Whitelist applications to further reduce the risk of malicious code being executed
Tighten permissions on USB mass storage and optical devices to help prevent data loss through removable media
Use Restrictions to blacklist locations users should not run applications from, or whitelist trusted applications that users are allowed to run
Include internal CA Certificates where appropriate to ensure users can authenticate network services
Include corporate network profiles (eg 802.1X or Wi-Fi) to ensure that network access credentials are distributed securely
Device provisioning steps

Follow these steps to provision each end user device onto your organisation’s network in preparation for distribution to end users.

These instructions assume the device is new or the operating system has been wiped and reinstalled.

On first boot, the device will present a number of prompts. In these prompts:
Firstly, create a local Administrator account. This will be used to locally manage the device. Credentials should not be given to the end user. A strong password should be entered at this stage.
Secondly, skip the Apple ID creation and entry.
Location Services can be enabled if required.
The device can be registered with Apple if required.

Local settings should now be set. A script is provided to automatically provision these settings, but they can also be configured manually.
Disable any non-required services (eg IPv6, infrared)
Enable low-overhead security features (eg firewall, updates)
Set user security policies (eg timeouts, screen lock, password hints)
Create a standard user account
Make the user’s home folder accessible only to that user
Lock down the user’s Terminal/Shell access. The user should have a limited Bash profile, which can be set as part of .bash_profile. This file should be owned by the root user so that modifications cannot be made. The user’s PATH should be set to a folder in the user’s directory and required applications symlinked to this directory
Create a Disk Encryption user which will have a strong password used to decrypt the disk. Part of this password could be from a password entry token such as a YubiKey
Alternatively, increase the password complexity of the primary user so that there is only one password required to decrypt and log in
Enable FileVault 2 and encrypt the disk. Only give the Disk Encryption user access to decrypt the disk
Turn on automatic updates via System Settings -> App store settings
Turn off initial iCloud login prompt for first user login. This will stop the user being prompted to use iCloud
Set FileVault 2 to remove the key on sleep, and set the sleep mode to Hibernate
To help prevent DMA and cold-boot attacks, set a Firmware Password

The device should now be enrolled with the MDM server and the configuration profiles applied
At this stage, any additional third-party applications can be installed (eg productivity apps)
Distribute the device, disk encryption password and user password separately to the user
The user should then change their password and skip the Apple ID registration step at the next time they log on
Device imaging

Instead of provisioning each device individually, an alternative option is to produce a master device image which can be deployed onto devices. The recommended approach for creating a standard disk image is to install the OS, create a local admin account and apply local policies, then install any required applications on a client machine.

The client machine is then connected to an imaging server in target disk mode. Apple’s System Image Utility can then be used to create a NetRestore or NetBoot image of the device. The image can then be used to provision other machines. NetBoot images can also be created from OS X installers downloaded from Apple, though care should be taken to ensure that the version downloaded can be deployed on the specific hardware you are using.

Note that enabling FileVault 2 and MDM enrolment must only be done after the device has been imaged. This ensures that the cryptographic keys involved in these security features are different.

Apple’s website has a support article that contains details about creating images for device-specific versions of OS X. The article can be found at

Recommended policies and settings

This section details important security policy settings which are recommended for an OS X deployment. Other settings (eg server address etc.) should be chosen according to the relevant network configuration. These settings should be applied through a profile (or combination of profiles) created on the MDM server.

The settings below are named as they appear in Apple Configurator and Profile Manager. Other products may use different names for these settings.

General Group

Security (when can profile be removed)


Automatic profile removal


Mail/Exchange/Calendar Groups (as appropriate)

Allow messages to be moved


Use Only in Mail


Use SSL (for internal and external host)


VPN Group

Connection Type


Machine Authentication


Enable VPN on Demand


Security & Privacy Group

Send diagnostic and usage data to Apple


Do not allow user to override Gatekeeper setting


Restrictions Group

Restrict which system preferences are enabled


Network, Profiles, Sharing and iCloud should be disallowed. Other panes may be disabled at the organisation’s discretion.

Allow use of Game Center


Allow only the following Dashboard widgets to run

Do not add any widgets. This will stop any widgets from being able to access the Dashboard.

Select services that should be available in the share menu

Untick all

Media access settings can be used to limit user access to removable media such as USB drives, writeable optical media and AirDrop.

Authentication policy

Your organisation should have a consistent authentication policy which applies to all users and devices capable of accessing its data. You can use the published password guidance to help inform any password policy. An administrator should configure the relevant on-device settings in line with your authentication policy.

For further guidance on defining an authentication policy, see the EUD Security Guidance introduction.

To enforce this policy on OS X devices, the following settings are available, and should be set according to the policy:

Allow simple value
Require alpha-numeric value
Minimum passcode length
Minimum number of complex characters
Maximum Auto-Lock
Maximum number of failed attempts
Hardware strengthening

OS X passwords for FileVault 2 are not strengthened using hardware. As such, it must be sufficiently complex to prevent offline brute force attacks. Login attempts are limited by policy, so need to be strong enough to resist manual guessing attempts.

VPN profile



Certificate type


Encryption algorithm


Integrity algorithm


Diffie-Hellman group


Dead peer detection interval


Enable perfect forward secrecy


Disable redirects


Disable mobility and multihoming


Enable certificate revocation check


VPN On Demand


In OS X 10.9, the mechanism for configuring the VPN On Demand settings changed, and none of the tested MDM utilities currently has a GUI for this new mechanism. To configure the VPN On Demand to trigger for all outgoing connections, follow the steps below:

Configure the VPN settings using the MDM and test the profile on the device to ensure it connects manually
Export the VPN configuration profile (unsigned) from the MDM as a .mobileconfig file. Convert this to text using `plutil` if required.
Using a text editor, modify the XML configuration inside the exported file. Within the IKEv2 key, add rules for OnDemandEnabled & OnDemandRules as shown below:







Import the modified configuration to the MDM and deploy to the device
In profile manager, it is possible to set ‘Always on VPN (iOS supervised only)’. However, this causes the profile install to fail on OS X devices, so the approach described above should be used instead.

Note that for an OS X device to successfully verify the VPN server certificate, the certificate must have a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) entry that matches the common name.

Other settings

If not required, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi should be turned off before giving the device to the user. The user will be able to turn Wi-Fi back on if they need it.

Kernel Modules can be removed to prevent access to removable media and network interfaces, but this is unsupported and will be reset during some software updates. Instructions on how to do this can be found on pages 249 onwards of

Other considerations

The following additional points address issues specific to OS X deployments.


Users must not enable iCloud as this provides device control to Apple and may allow data to leak through iCloud backup and application storage. This can be achieved by not signing into the Apple ID when prompted by the operating system. Other Apple applications such as iTunes can be used with an Apple ID without enabling iCloud integration if this is required.


In order for the organisation to retain the ability to access the device in the event the FileVault 2 encryption password is lost, it should be ensured that the local administrator user has permission to unlock the FileVault encryption. This option is available within the Security & Privacy section of System Settings, under FileVault. A keychain can also be created by setting a Master Password (from the Users & Groups service menu). This keychain can be distributed to all managed OS X devices before enabling FileVault and will be acknowledged during the process of enabling FileVault. More information on this process can be found at and pages 15 onwards of


In OS X 10.10, a new concept known as extensions was added. This allows application developers to extend the functionality of their application beyond the original application. As an example, the sharing extension could allow a user to share information to social network sites from an application. Your organisation should control which applications are installed in the environment and limit the ability for applications to interface to the user via Extensions. This can partially be configured as part of your organisation’s MDM solution.


A new feature which was introduced in iOS 8 and OS X 10.10 is Handoff. This allows a user to push documents being read from an iOS device to an OS X device to continue reading. As an example, a user can open a webpage using Safari on an iOS device and then continue reading the webpage on an OS X device using Handoff. This requires a user to login with an Apple ID. It is recommended that users are asked not to use this feature, as information and data is sent to Apple servers.

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